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TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFECTS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA:  A CASE STUDY
Tulus Tambunan*
The impact of international trade policy reform on the Indonesian
economy, particularly in the areas of economic growth and development
of the domestic manufacturing industry, has been studied extensively.
However, the implications of such reform on the growth of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia remain under-researched.
This paper thus contributes to filling the gap by examining the impact
of international trade policy reform, particularly following the 1997 crisis,
on the growth of SMEs in Indonesia.  Two main questions are posited:
(a) how does international trade policy reform affect local SMEs?; and
(b) has the growth of SME exports accelerated since the reform? The
study does not find evidence that the reform has affected SMEs
negatively.  On the contrary, with the exception of a slight decline in
1998 due to the economic crisis, the number of SMEs has been growing.
The paper suggests that such enterprises have not only managed to
survive, but they have also been able to increase their output.  Their
exports also increased annually.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The international trade regime in Indonesia has undergone fundamental
changes since the 1980s, with a reduction of many tariffs on imports accompanied
by a gradual shift from an inward-looking import substitution policy to an outward-
looking export promotion strategy.  Indonesia has also removed all non-tariff barriers
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and export restrictions.  The process of trade policy reform accelerated shortly
after the economic crisis of 1997.  The Indonesian Government reduced tariffs on
all imported food items to a maximum of 5 per cent, deregulated its trade regime
in the major agricultural commodities (except rice, for social reasons), terminated
production and trade monopolies in certain intermediate industries (cement, plywood
and rattan) and reduced export taxes on wood and many other commodities.
The impact of international trade policy reforms on the Indonesian economy,
particularly in the areas of economic growth and development of the domestic
manufacturing industry, has been studied extensively.  However, the implications
of such reform on the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
Indonesia remain an under-researched area.  This paper thus contributes to filling
the gap by examining the impact of international trade policy reforms, particularly
following the 1997 crisis, on the growth of SMEs in Indonesia.  In particular, answers
to the following two questions are sought:  (a) how does international trade policy
reform affect local SMEs?; and (b) has growth of SME exports accelerated since
the reform?
Following a brief review of the literature available on the effects of
international trade policy reforms on SMEs, overviews of international trade
reform in Indonesia and of the development of Indonesian SMEs are presented in
chapters III and IV, respectively.  Effects of the reform on Indonesian SMEs are
examined in section V.  Concluding remarks and policy recommendations are given
in section VII.
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
The Asian region provides evidence of the benefits of external trade
liberalization policies (in terms of exports and imports).  With its continued growth
in external trade, the region continues to generate the highest rates of economic
growth in the world, and experienced an average reduction in poverty of about
12.5 per cent between the early 1990s and early 2000.  Through external trade, the
region has been further integrated into and benefited from the global economy
(Bonapace 2005).
In most Asian economies, SMEs are considered the engine of economic
growth by virtue of their numbers and their significant economic and social
contributions.  The role of such enterprises in industrial development is more
pronounced in Asia than it is in the West.  SMEs in developing Asia account for
about 80 per cent of all non-agricultural enterprises, and generate about the sameAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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percentage of total employment.  In addition, they contribute between 40 and
70 per cent of total value added (Tambunan 2008).
In member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
SMEs have played increasingly strategic roles, especially in the aftermath of the
1997 Asian financial crisis.  As those economies modernize and industrialize, SMEs
are providing the much-needed inter-firm linkages required to support large
enterprises and ensure that they remain competitive in world markets.  In this
subregion, SMEs generally account for more than 90 per cent of establishments,
between 15 and 57 per cent of total gross output/value added, and between 32.5
and more than 90 per cent of the employment of the domestic workforce (table 1).
Table 1.  Non-agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises in members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and selected countries
in East Asia
Number of
Percentage of gross domestic
SMEs as a percentage of







b (2004) .. 98.0 92.0
Cambodia 26 (2002) .. 99.0 45.0
Indonesia 21 896 (2006) 57.0 (total value added) 99.9 99.6
Lao People’s Democratic 22
 (1998/99) .. 99.4 ..
Republic
26
c .. .. 40.0
c
Malaysia 205 15.0 (total gross output) 99.2 65.1
47.3 (total value added) 32.5
d
26.0 (manufacturing value added)
Myanmar 34 (1998/99) 96.0 78.0
Philippines 68
e (2001) 32.0 (total value added) 99.6 99.0




b 41.0 (manufacturing output) 97.8 58.0
34.7 (total value added)
Thailand 1 639 (2001) 47.0 (total value added)/40.0 (GDP) 79.0
(2001) (2001)
2 274
 (2006) 38.0 (GDP) (2006) 99.6 76.7
(2006)
Viet Nam 2 700
f 42.0 (total value added) 96.0 86/85
g




China 8 000 60.0 (industrial output) 99.0 78.8
Hong Kong, China 292 99.3 60.7
Japan 6 140 52.0 (manufacturing output), 99.7 77.6
55.3 (total value added)
Republic of Korea 2 700 47.5 (total gross output), 99.8 86.7
50.0 (total value added)
Taiwan Province of China 1 050 98.1 78.4
Sources: Tambunan (2006a; 2008, Table III.1).
Note: Figures are for 2002, unless otherwise indicated.
Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; SME, small and medium-sized enterprise




e Excluding 744,000 microenterprises.
f Excluding 10 million microenterprises.
g Total permanent workers/total corporate workforce.
h Best guess for 2000.
Table 1.  (continued)
Number of
Percentage of gross domestic
SMEs as a percentage of






It is generally believed that trade liberalization should be beneficial for the
domestic economy as well as for the world as a whole.  At an aggregate level, the
channels through which trade reform could bring benefits are, broadly, the following:
(a) improved resource allocation; (b) access to better technologies, inputs and
intermediate goods; (c) economies of scale and scope; (d) greater domestic
competition; and (e) availability of favourable growth externalities, such as transfer
of know-how.  Until recently, more attention has been given to the macroeconomic
effects of international trade reforms.
1 There is now a small but growing empirical
literature on the effects of international trade liberalization at a disaggregate level.
Theoretically, reform towards international trade liberalization could affect (positively
or negatively) local individual firms in four major ways:
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(a) Increasing competition.  Lower import tariffs, quotas and other non-
tariff barriers increase foreign competition in the domestic market.
This is expected to encourage inefficient or unproductive local firms
to try to improve their productivity by eliminating waste, exploiting
external economies of scale and scope, and adopting more
innovative technologies; if they cannot, the pressure is expected
to force them to shut down.  Greater openness of an economy to
international trade leads to larger enterprises, because local firms
adopt efficient technologies and exploit economies of scale;
2
(b) Lowering production costs through cheaper imported inputs.  Local
firms benefit from lower input costs, which allow them to compete
more effectively in domestic markets against imports and in export
markets;
(c) Increasing export opportunities.  Opening up to international
competition will not only induce increased efficiency in domestic
firms but will also stimulate their exports;
3
(d) Reducing availability of local inputs.  Eliminating export restrictions
on unprocessed raw materials will increase export of the items at
the cost of local industries.
In the case of SMEs, it can thus be expected that international trade
liberalization that increases foreign competition in the domestic market will hurt
some inefficient or uncompetitive SMEs, while benefiting efficient or competitive
SMEs.  The efficiency effects of foreign trade liberalization may lead to an increase
in average plant size among SMEs and (presumably) lower average costs.  The
international literature on the effect of foreign trade policy on SMEs presents,
however, some surprising and important findings.  The seminal work of Tybout
(2000) on the microdynamic effects of international trade liberalization on
manufacturing firms in developing countries, for instance, consistently shows just
2 This is in line with the general theory in which size is predicted to positively affect export
performance of firms.  The new international trade theory posits a positive impact of market size in
view of economies of scale.  It argues that the scale economy provides cost advantages in production,
research and development and marketing efforts.  See for instance, Tybout (1992) and Bonaccorsi
(1992).  The literature associated with export marketing suggests that large enterprises have greater
resources for gathering information on markets in foreign countries and covering the uncertainties of
a foreign market (see, for example, Wakelin 1997).  It is therefore generally expected that large
enterprises are likely to be more export-oriented than small and medium-sized enterprises.
3 This is generally supported by econometric results.  See, for example, Aggarwal (2001) and
Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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the opposite:  that increases in import penetration as well as reductions in protection
are associated with reductions, not increases, in plant size.  Thus, an important
finding of that study is that liberalization, rather than improve efficiency immediately,
may work against the scale efficiency of SMEs in the short run (or if there are
gains in efficiency, they are quite small).
Tybout’s findings are supported by Tewari’s (2001) findings regarding the
experience of Tamil Nadu, India, over the past 15 years.  The government removed
restrictions on many industries, allowing anyone to enter, and simultaneously
liberalized trade.  Shortly thereafter, there was a spate of relatively small firms
entering those industries, notably textiles.  Firms with 400 to 500 spindles set up
shop, in contrast to the plants with 10,000 to 20,000 spindles that larger firms
operated.  By the mid-1990s, the average plant size in the spinning industry had
fallen significantly.
Valodia and Velia (2004) investigated the relationship between foreign trade
liberalization at the macrolevel and its micro- or firm-level adjustment effects in the
South African manufacturing industry.  Their findings suggest that there is a strong
relationship between firm size and international trade.  Most firms servicing only
domestic markets are SMEs, whereas the majority of exporters are large enterprises;
almost half of exporters are firms with more than 200 workers.  It seems that larger
firms have been more successful at integrating their manufacturing activities into
global chains of production.
Tewari and Goebel (2002) studied SME competitiveness, also in Tamil Nadu.
They found two interesting facts.  First, SMEs are doing better in some industries
than in others; just as some industries are doing better than others.  Second,
SMEs tied to low-end market segments in large urban or metro areas appear to be
the most vulnerable to cheap import competition.  SMEs serving similar niches in
the rural areas or in small towns do not face the same pressures.  Their access to
intricate, socially embedded distribution networks that link them to rural markets
appears to be a source of strength that non-local competitors find too costly to
replicate.
Others, such as Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman (2002), Roberts and
Tybout (1996) and Roberts (2000), suggest that the path to growth for SMEs in
a trade-liberalized world lies in their ability to compete with imported goods and
services.  This, in turn, depends greatly on their ability to upgrade their production
capacities, their access to human resources and new technology, and their ability
to improve the quality of their products.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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III.  SME DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA:  AN OVERVIEW
In Indonesia, SMEs have historically been the main players in domestic
economic activities, especially as providers of employment opportunities, and hence
generators of primary or secondary sources of income for many households.  For
low-income and poor farm households in rural areas, SMEs, especially small
enterprises (including microenterprises), in non-farm activities are a particularly
important source of employment.  As a group, these enterprises have also been an
important engine for the development of local economies and communities.
However, compared with more developed economies, Indonesian SMEs are not yet
contributing significant value added to the national economy.  Instead, they have
been more important as the locus of employment.
4
Though no data are available to show how many SMEs operate in the
informal sector, it is generally believed that numbers are high, particularly with
respect to microenterprises.  The informal sector refers to the part of the economy
that operates outside the ambit of organized economic activities.  The sector is
characterized by:  (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) family
ownership of enterprises; (d) small scale of operations; (e) lack of formal systems
of organization; (f) low and uncertain incomes; (g) labour-intensive and adapted
technology; (h) skills acquired outside the formal school system; (i) no social welfare
or security; and (j) unregulated and competitive markets.  In Indonesia, the informal
sector played a crucial role during the economic crisis in 1997, as it absorbed
many people who had lost their jobs in the formal sector.
Typically, SMEs in Indonesia account for more than 90 per cent of all
firms, and thus they are the largest source of employment, providing a livelihood
4 In Indonesia, there are several definitions of small and medium-sized enterprises, depending on
which agency provides the definition.  As the present paper uses data from the State Ministry of
Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises (Menegkop & UKM), the Ministry of Industry, and
Statistics Indonesia (the central statistical agency), only the definitions of these three government
agencies are used.  Menegkop & UKM promulgated the Law on Small Enterprises No. 20 of 2008,
which defines a microenterprise as a business unit with total initial assets of up to 50 million rupiah
(Rp), not including land and buildings, or with an annual value of sales of a maximum of Rp 300
million.  A small enterprise is defined as a business unit with total initial assets of up to Rp 500
million, or with an annual value of sales of a maximum of Rp 2.5 billion, and a medium-sized enterprise
as a business unit with total initial assets of up to Rp 10 billion or with an annual value of sales of up
to Rp 50 billion.  Statistics Indonesia, which regularly conducts surveys of small and medium-sized
enterprises, uses the number of workers as the basis for determining the size of an enterprise.  In its
definition, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises are business units with, respectively, 1-4,
5-19, and 20-99 workers, and large enterprises are units with 100 or more workers.  The Department
of Industry categorizes an enterprise by its size in its sector and according to number of workers,
following the Statistics Indonesia definition.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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for over 90 per cent of the country’s workforce, especially women and youth.  The
majority of SMEs in Indonesia are very small (microenterprises), and are scattered
widely throughout the rural areas.  Microenterprises are the most traditional
enterprises, dominated by self-employment units without hired paid workers.  They
generally use primitive methods of production, generally with low levels of
productivity, and produce poor quality goods mainly for local markets.  There is
little or no technological dynamism in this group of enterprises, and the majority
provide barely a subsistence-level living.  Some are economically viable over the
long term, but many are not.  Given such characteristics, microenterprises have
more difficulties than SMEs in facing changing technology and the growing demand
for higher quality, modern products.
Indonesian SMEs are most concentrated in agriculture, followed by the
hospitality industry and the manufacturing industry.  In manufacturing, SMEs are
involved mainly in simple traditional products, such as wood products and furniture,
textiles and garments, footwear, and food and beverages.  Only a small portion of
total SMEs produce machinery, production tools or automotive components.  The
latter is generally carried out through subcontracting arrangements with multinational
car companies (Thee 1993 and Tambunan 2008).  This structure of industry reflects
the current technological capability of Indonesian SMEs, which are not yet as strong
in producing sophisticated technology-embodied products as their counterparts in
other economies such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, or Taiwan Province of
China.
According to Statistics Indonesia (various years) the contribution of SMEs
(including microenterprises) to annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth is higher
than that of large enterprises.  In 2003, the GDP growth rate was 4.78 per cent, of
which 2.66 per cent was attributable to SMEs, compared to a contribution of
2.12 per cent from large enterprises.  In 2005, the SME share in GDP growth
reached its highest level—3.18 per cent—before slightly declining to 3.06 per cent
in 2006.  Within the SME group, the combined contribution of micro- and small
enterprises to GDP growth is always higher than that of medium-sized enterprises.
In 2006, of a GDP growth rate of 5.5 per cent, about 2.15 per cent was attributable
to micro- and small enterprises, as compared to 0.91 per cent from medium-sized
enterprises (figure 1).  Unfortunately, no separate data on output are available for
microenterprises.  However, since the total number of such enterprises is much
larger than that of small enterprises (see table 2), there is a strong reason to
believe that the greater part of the contribution of micro- and small enterprises to
the GDP growth, as shown in figure 1, came from microenterprises.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Figure 1.  GDP growth contribution by size of firm, 2003-2006
(Percentage)
Table 2.  Total units of enterprises by size category, Indonesia, 1997-2006
(Thousands of units)
Size
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
category
Micro- 36 528.3 33 085.5 35 158.2 36 131.7 35 894.8 40 336.8 41 109.7 42 306.2 44 428.8
enterprises
Small 3 176.4 3 676.2 2 646.3 3 573.5 3 988.3 3 036.1 3 574.8 4 700.7 4 394.1
enterprises
Medium-sized 60.5 51.9 51.8 78.8 81.0 87.4 93.0 95.9 106.7
enterprises
Large 2.1 1.8 1.8 5.7 5.9 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.2
enterprises
Total 39 767.3 36 815.4 37 858.1 39 789.7 39 970.0 43 466.8 44 784.1 47 109.6 48 936.8
Source: State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Menegkop & UKM)
database (available at www.depkop.go.id).
Source: Statistics Indonesia.
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IV.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY REFORM IN INDONESIA
When former Indonesian President Soeharto came to power in 1966,
marking the beginning of the “New Order” Government (1966-1998), he initiated
swift economic reform which, in its first five years, produced results beyond the
most optimistic expectations.  The main aim of the reform was two-pronged, namely,
to reduce inflation (a short-term objective) and to generate economic growth and
improve living standards (a medium- to a long-term objective).  The Government
was fully aware that macroeconomic stabilization was a precondition for achieving
the first objective, and that international trade reform and liberalization of the capital
account, including a more favourable investment law, were the most effective
strategies for achieving the second.
During the New Order era, trade policy underwent a fundamental change
in Indonesia.  At the same time, development strategy evolved from the inward-
looking import substitution approach of the oil boom in the early 1970s to an
outward-looking policy of export promotion in the mid-1980s once the oil boom
ended.  The process of the trade reform that was part of the economic reform from
1966 to 2006 can be divided into three phases:  1967-1984, 1985-1997 (just before
the economic crisis), and 1998 (during the crisis) onwards (table 3).  The first
phase was a period of limited liberalization and deregulation, as the Government
implemented limited tariff reduction and removed quantitative restrictions and other
non-tariff barriers on a small range of imported goods, particularly those which
were essential for domestic consumption and industries.
Table 3.  Reform in foreign trade and related areas in Indonesia since 1967
Period Phase Most important measures
1967 to 1984 I • Some tariff reduction
• Removal of quantitative restrictions on limited imports
• Introduction of a national law on foreign and domestic private
investment
• Liberalization of the capital account in the balance of payments
• Adoption of a managed floating exchange rate system
1985  to  1997 II • Simplification of import-export procedures (including the duty
drawback scheme for exporters, which was improved
substantially)
• Limited agricultural liberalization
• Across-the-board tariff reduction
• Removal of quantitative restrictions on some imports, especially
import licensing and import monopoliesAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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• Simplification of approval procedures for foreign investment and
abolition of limitations on foreign direct investment, especially
export-oriented investments (including more liberal treatment with
regard to foreign ownership)
• A revamping and replacement of the corrupt customs service
with a private Swiss surveying company (Société Générale de
Surveillance)
• Exemption from duties and value added tax for export-oriented
investments
• Banking system deregulation
1998 onwards III • Liberalization of foreign trade and investment
• Elimination of all cartels in all sectors
• Agricultural liberalization, including actions such as:  (a) removing
import restrictions on various commodities; (b) removing export
bans on wheat, soybeans, sugar and oil palm products;
(c) replacing the monopoly role the State logistics agency (Bulog)
played in rice imports with a 30 per cent tariff; (d) removing local
content regulation for agricultural products; (e) privatizing
plantations, estates and input suppliers; (f) liquidating
cooperatives and removing land-use regulations that restricted
crop choices of producers; (g) suspending the value added tax on
rice and other essential commodities; (h) eliminating wheat, sugar
and fertilizer subsidies; (i) phasing out soybean subsidies;
(j) eliminating import subsidies and relevant import duties for
soybean meal and fishmeal; and (k) allowing private traders to
import rice, for the first time in 30 years
• Removal of various import licensing schemes, such as the import
licences for iron and steel products, engine and engine parts,
heavy transport equipment, and electronic products
• Removal of local content requirements, reduction of tariffs on
imported cars and components, and simplification of licensing
procedures
• Elimination of all export restrictions and taxes
• Introduction of anticorruption and competition laws
• Approval of Importer and Approved Sole Agent licences, which
were applied to various industries, from food-related products to
lubricants
• Removal of local content regulations under the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures,
as well as the local content requirements for motor vehicles
Source: Tambunan (2007b).
Table 3.  (continued)
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The second phase was a period of extensive liberalization and deregulation,
with a broad range of measures.  Between 1985 and 1992, the simple (unweighted)
average tariff was cut to just under 20 per cent, down from 27 per cent.  Non-tariff
barriers as a percentage of tariff lines had declined from 32 down to 17 per cent
by 1990 and to 5 per cent by 1992; as a percentage of imports they fell from
43 per cent in 1986 down to 13 per cent by 1990 (Iqbal and Rashid 2001).  The
private sector began to play a larger role during this period, as reflected by the
increase in private domestic as well as foreign investments in Indonesia.  There
was also an emphasis on exports of non-oil and gas products, especially labour-
intensive manufactured products, such as textiles and garments, footwear and
wood products.  Restrictions on foreign direct investment and ownership regulations,
particularly on export-oriented investments, were gradually relaxed (Pangestu 2001).
The third phase is the broader post-crisis reform, which began with the
International Monetary Fund-sponsored deregulation under a letter of intent and
continued further with Indonesia’s own initiatives.  One of the most heavily regulated
and protected sectors of the Indonesian economy, the automobile industry, was
significantly affected by these developments.  The tariff on completely built-up
sedans was reduced to 200 per cent in 1995 and to 90 per cent in 2003.
Figure 2 shows the result of the foreign trade reform.  The ratio of total
trade (export plus import) to GDP increased steadily from the early 1990s up to
Figure 2.  Growth in the external trade of Indonesia, 1993-2006
(Total trade as a percentage of gross domestic product)
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1998, when the crisis reached its climax.  That was also the year when many
companies, especially in the manufacturing industry, experienced financial difficulties
as a consequence of the huge depreciation of the rupiah (Rp) against the United
States dollar.  After 1999, Indonesia’s external trade began to recover.
The bold reforms also resulted in rapid economic growth and an extremely
rapid transformation from the beginning of the 1970s to 1997.  High economic
growth, together with low inflation, raised per capita income more than tenfold,
from $70 in 1969 to $1,100 in 1997 (current prices).  In 1998 the per capita income
dropped significantly, but in 2000 it started to recover, though the process has
been slow.  The growth rate of per capita real GDP is still much lower than that of
Thailand, another country seriously affected by the 1997 crisis.  Growth during the
New Order era was matched by similar success on the income distribution side.
The number of people living below the poverty line was reduced from 70 million in
1970 to 26 million in 1993.  This meant that the percentage of people living below
the poverty line dropped to 14 per cent, down from 60 per cent.
5
V.  EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ON SMEs IN INDONESIA
The rapid growth of the manufacturing industry and non-oil and gas exports
in Indonesia before the 1997 crisis was an important success attributable to the
trade policy reforms, which were accompanied by reforms in other important related
areas, such as the investment and banking sector.  However, there are always
concerns regarding the survival of SMEs in the country.  On the import side, can
local SMEs survive if imports are allowed to freely enter the domestic market?  On
the export side, have export opportunities been more open for local SMEs since
the reform? Has the growth of exports by SMEs accelerated since the reform?
With respect to the first question, after a slight decline in 1998 (many
SMEs were adversely affected by the crisis), the number of SMEs continued to
grow (figure 3).  Of course, many SMEs in Indonesia must have difficulties in facing
the stiff competition from the imports in the domestic market that is growing as
a direct consequence of the trade policy reform.  But figure 3 may suggest that
SMEs in Indonesia in general have not been severely affected by trade liberalization.
More interestingly, the number of SMEs tends to grow faster than that of large
enterprises.
Moreover, the GDP share of SMEs remains above 50 per cent; in other
words, the ratio of SMEs to large enterprises in GDP contribution is always above
one, although it has been declining since its peak level in 2002 (figure 4).  If the
5 The remarkable economic development in Indonesia during the New Order Government is discussed
in many publications, including:  Booth and McCawley (1981), Hill (1996) and Tambunan (2006b).Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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Figure 3.  Growth in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises
(excluding microenterprises) and large enterprises, 1997-2006





















Figure 4.  Ratio of small and medium-sized enterprises to large enterprises
in terms of gross domestic product contribution, 2000-2006
Source: State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Menegkop & UKM)
database (www.depkop.go.id).
Note: The data on small and medium-sized enterprises include microenterprises (no separate data
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reforms before and after the crisis favoured large enterprises, the share of SME
contribution to GDP would have fallen to less than 50 per cent.  SMEs have
managed not only to survive, but also to increase their output.  There is thus no
evidence to support the suspected negative correlation between the openness of
the Indonesian economy that resulted from the trade reforms and the existence of
local SMEs.
With respect to the second and third questions, not only are SMEs able to
export, but their exports increase on average per year.  In 2000, their total exports
amounted to Rp 75,449 billion; by 2006, exports had increased by 50 per cent to
Rp 122,200 billion (table 4).  However, the share of SMEs in the country’s total
exports (excluding oil and gas) is still very small as compared to that of large
enterprises.  In 1990, their share was 11.1 per cent; by 2006 it was 15.7 per cent.
Medium-sized enterprises are much stronger in exports than small enterprises are.
In 1990, medium-sized enterprises accounted for 8.9 per cent of total exports,
compared with 2.2 per cent for small enterprise.  In 2006 the ratio was 11.81 to
3.89 per cent (figure 5).
The majority of SME exports came from the manufacturing industry.
However, the share of SMEs in total exports of the manufacturing industry continues
to be smaller than that of large enterprises (figure 6).  Many, such as Hill (1997),
Tambunan (2006a and 2007a) and Thee (1993) argue that, although on average
their annual export contribution to Indonesia’s total manufacturing export is relatively
small, SMEs seem to have shared in the manufactured export boom in the 1980s
and 1990s.  Thee (1993) concludes that, from the point of view of technology and
adaptability, export growth of SMEs in the manufacturing industry has been achieved
largely by finding niche markets and adapting costs and quality to market demand.
Perhaps the only microlevel evidence of the effects of trade reform in
Indonesia on SME exports is from a field study conducted by Berry and Levy
(1994).  They surveyed 91 SME exporters in three subsectors of manufacturing,
and conducted intensive interviews with 40 public and non-profit agencies active
in SME issues between January and June 1992.  The three subsectors were:
garments in Jakarta and Bandung (both in West Java), rattan furniture in Jakarta
and Surabaya (East Java) and carved wooden furniture in Jepara (Central Java).
From a total of 33 interviewed exporters of rattan products, they found that all but
one of the firms exported 90 per cent or more of their output; 26 of 33 firms began
exporting the same year they entered into production.  Most began to export or
increased their export share in their total production since the Government of
Indonesia imposed bans on the export of unprocessed and semi-processed rattanAsia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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T
able 4.  Exports of small and medium-sized enterprises and large enterprises in thr
ee major sectors,
2000-2006
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Figure 5.  Contributions of small and medium-sized enterprises to total
export value, 2000-2006
(Percentage)
Source: State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (Menegkop & UKM) database (www.depkop.go.id).
Note: The data on small and medium-sized enterprises include
microenterprises (no separate data are available for microenterprises).
Figure 6.  Share of small and medium-sized enterprises in total export
value in the manufacturing industry, 2000-2006
(Percentage)
Source: State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (Menegkop & UKM) database (www.depkop.go.id).
Note: The data on small and medium-sized enterprises include
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in 1986 and 1988-1989.  This suggests that the ban has been a key factor leading
to a major expansion in exports of rattan furniture by SMEs in Indonesia.
6
The view expressed by Berry and Levy (1994) is also supported by the
author’s own observations that free exports of raw materials have become serious
constraints for many SMEs that produce or export goods made from such materials.
For instance, several times during the 1980s and also in the 1990s, many SMEs in
metalworking industry clusters, for example in Tegal and Ceper in Central Java and
Pasuruan in East Java, experienced difficulties in continuing or expanding their
production due to the lack of local scraps—their main raw material.  This material
has been exported mainly to China, leading to a scarcity in the local market.
7 In
another case, PT Panasonic Manufacturing Indonesia, the leading electronic
company in Indonesia, has subcontracting linkages with many SMEs to manufacture
a variety of electronic products.  Recently, subcontractors that make water pumps
for the company have been facing difficulties due to a scarcity of one of their main
raw materials—brass, which is one of the raw materials that are free for export.
8
Shortly after the economic crisis in 1997, Dierman and others (1998) tried
to assess the impact of the more aggressive trade and investment policy reforms
related to the International Monetary Fund-sponsored deregulation on SMEs in the
manufacturing industry in Indonesia.  They concluded that the likely impact would
vary by subsector or group of industry.  SMEs in the industries that were most
protected before the crisis were expected to be more adversely affected than
those in the less protected ones.  For instance, currently many SMEs in the textile
and garment industry, one of the most protected industries before the crisis, are
struggling to compete with very cheap textile products from China, which have
been extensively penetrating the Indonesian market over the past few years.
Overall, based on the official data presented in the present paper and
several studies, including that of Van Dierman and others (1998), there is no
indication that the number of SMEs, including microenterprises, in Indonesia has
been negatively affected by the international trade reform (figure 7).  Moreover,
relying on protection that restricts certain activities to domestic SMEs may actually
6 Indonesia has long been a major supplier of raw rattan to the major rattan furniture exporting
areas of Taiwan Province of China and the Philippines.  In an effort to jump-start the rattan products
industry in the country, the Government of Indonesia imposed this restriction policy (Berry and Levy
1994).
7 Interviews by the author with some producers and local government officials in the Tegal cluster,
February 2007.
8 Interview by the author with Daniel Suhardiman, Group Manager from PT Panasonic Manufacturing
Indonesia.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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contribute to abuse of local market power and, by insulating firms from competition,
make them less able to penetrate foreign markets or develop improvements in
technology, productivity and efficiency (Thee 2000).  However, there is also no
evidence that the efficiency effects of trade liberalization resulted in an increase in
average plant size among SMEs.  This Indonesian case seems to be consistent
with the findings by Tybout (2000) that trade liberalization may work against the
(scale) efficiency of SMEs in the short run.
Figure 7.  Scatter diagram of the number of small and medium-sized
enterprises (including microenterprises) and trade in Indonesia
Sources: State Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Menegkop &
UKM) Perkembangan Indikator Makro UKM database, Table 1 (www.depkop.go.id), and
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As microenterprises represent the informal sector in Indonesia, it can also
be concluded that the informal sector has managed to survive the processes of
trade liberalization.  There are two main reasons for this.  First, although imported
goods, especially from China, have been penetrating the domestic market at an
accelerating rate in the period, such goods are still concentrated in urban areas or
cities, while microenterprises are still the dominant source of basic consumption
goods in rural areas.  Second, in general, imported goods are still more expensive
than those produced by the microenterprises on which most poor or low-income
households are dependent.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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As a comparison, in India as well as in China and other ASEAN countries
with more or less similar stages of development, SMEs have also been playing an
important role in exports, directly or indirectly (through subcontracting arrangements
with large enterprises, including multinational companies), although the rate varies
by country.  As can be seen in table 5, among the surveyed countries, SMEs in
China play the largest role, with export contributions running between 40 and
60 per cent.  SMEs in Thailand, which is more comparable to Indonesia in terms of
level of economic development, are more developed in export activities than their
counterparts in Indonesia (figure 8).
Table 5.  Share of small and medium-sized exports in total exports in
selected Asian developing countries, 1990s
Country 2003 Share (percentage) 2005-2006 Share (percentage)



















a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003), for manufactured export only.
b State Ministry of Cooperative and SME (Menegkop & UKM) database (www.depkop.go.id).
c United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003), ICICI Bank and International
Finance Corporation (2002), and Das (2007), for manufactured export only.
d Tambunan (2008).
e Thailand (2007).
All this evidence may suggest that trade openness does not negatively
affect local SMEs.  But neither does it automatically lead local SMEs to become
exporters or increase their external market shares.  It depends, among many other
things, on the role of government in supporting capacity-building for local SMEs
so that they can become highly competitive exporters.  In other words, trade
liberalization creates export market opportunities only for efficient and highly
competitive local SMEs.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The rapid economic growth and rapid transformation of the Indonesian
economy in the New Order era may be due largely to the combination of reforms in
trade and other related areas, such as investment and banking, undertaken during
that period.  After the economic crisis in 1997-1998, more aggressive reforms also
started to show some results, as the country’s GDP began growing again in 1999
and it has kept growing at an accelerating rate.
In the present paper, two main questions were posited:  (a) how does
international trade policy reform affect local SMEs?; and (b) has the growth of SME
exports accelerated since the reform? The official data presented in the paper
suggest that, overall, the reform has not affected SMEs negatively.  However, the
majority of SMEs (especially small and microenterprises) in Indonesia are not yet
ready to compete due to their weaknesses in many areas, including, among others:
technology, human resources, capital, marketing knowledge and global networks.
Figure 8.  Export share of small and medium-sized enterprises in Thailand,
2001-2006
(Percentage)
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Therefore, the Government should take concrete actions in order to help SMEs
maximize benefits and minimize losses related to the trade reform over the long
run.  This policy implication is also valid for many other Asian developing countries,
where conditions for SMEs are similar to those in Indonesia.
The required policy actions are particularly related to the following aspects.
First, trade liberalization should be accompanied by development schemes designed
to support long-term capacity-building for SMEs; such schemes should focus on
six major areas:  (a) credit and market information; (b) human resource development;
(c) technology and innovation; (d) global networks in both input and output markets;
(e) subcontracting opportunities and capabilities; and (f) infrastructure that increases
access for local SMEs to broader markets.  Second, trade reform policies should
be carefully designed to prevent the liberalization of exports of unprocessed
commodities which are the key raw materials for SMEs, as such liberalization could
lead to shortages of these items in the local market and reduce the production
capacity of SMEs.  Third, new plans with respect to trade regulations should be
disseminated to all SMEs through all available channels (such as electronic media,
newspapers, press releases and public gatherings) in advance of their
implementation.  At the same time, the Government should provide SMEs with
effective alternative solutions in order to minimize the negative effects or maximize
the positive effects of such new policies or regulations.  Fourth, SMEs represented
by, among other entities, SME associations or non-governmental organizations,
should be more actively involved in the preparation and formulation of economic
policies (such as in trade and investment) that will affect them directly or indirectly.Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 15, No. 2, December 2008
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